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What determines the composition of external liabilities, both across countries and over time? More 
specifically, which countries account for the massive increase in equity-like liabilities (foreign direct 
investment and portfolio equity), especially since the mid-1990s? The empirical analysis draws on the 
newly-released “External Wealth of Nations Mark II” dataset. In the cross-section, we find that larger, 
more open economies with a better institutional quality score have a greater equity share in external 
liabilities, which is also positively related to natural resource production. Along the time-series 
dimension, we find that the shift towards equity financing is stronger among those countries that have 
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1.  Introduction  
What determines the composition of external liabilities, both across countries and over time? While 
the debt/equity choice is a key question in corporate finance, international economics has paid limited 
attention to the relative weights of equity-like items (foreign direct investment and portfolio equity—
henceforth “equity”) and debt in total external liabilities. Yet, a high share of equity in total external 
liabilities is generally viewed as desirable for improving a country’s ability to share risk with 
international investors and its resilience to external shocks (Rogoff, 1999). First, equity-type 
instruments offer a greater potential for international risk sharing because the return on equity tends to 
be procyclical, with the return to the foreign investor lower when the economy is experiencing 
difficulties and higher during boom conditions. Second, equity (FDI in particular) appears to be more 
stable, especially in times of sudden stop to financial flows (Levchenko and Mauro, 2006).  
A few studies have begun to fill this gap, on both the theoretical side (Albuquerque, 2003; 
Razin and others, 1998; Schnitzer, 2002) and the empirical side (Faria and Mauro, 2004; Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2001b; Wei, 2001). However, previous empirical studies have primarily relied on 
cross-sectional information, with Albuquerque (2003) a notable exception. The massive increase in 
FDI and portfolio equity as a share of both GDP and total liabilities, especially since the mid-1990s, 
suggests that time series information can also contribute to a better understanding of external capital 
structure. Accordingly, we take advantage of the recent availability of more extensive time-series data 
and investigate the correlates of changes over time in external liability structures, while also 
providing updated cross-sectional estimates to inform our analysis. We are especially interested in 
exploring the potential connection between changes in the external capital structure and changes in 
domestic institutions and policies. Do countries that undertake investor-friendly reforms experience 
an increase in inward FDI? Do reforms that improve the climate for equity investment result in a shift 
in the external capital structure towards equity instruments?  
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2.  Data Description and Stylized Facts Motivating the Analysis 
 
All data on gross liabilities are drawn from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The stylized facts that 
constitute the point of departure of our analysis are illustrated in a few simple charts. Total external 
liabilities have displayed a major increase as a share of GDP since the 1970s (Figure 1, top panel), 
particularly for the high-income countries, where bilateral financial integration has often taken a two-
way form (assets and liabilities), in a manner loosely analogous to that observed for intra-industry 
trade among advanced countries. This increase has been especially pronounced for equity since the 
1980s, and has further accelerated since the mid-1990s (middle panel). The share of equity has 
increased since the 1980s, for both high-income and—to a slightly greater extent—other countries as 
well (bottom panel).  
         Figure 2 shows that the ratio of equity to total liabilities varies substantially across countries. It 
also reveals a widespread increase in this ratio between 1996 and 2004 (indicated by most data points 
being to the left of the 45 degree line), with the extent of the change in external capital structure 
differing markedly across countries. In what follows, we seek to establish some key correlates of the 
cross-country and cross-time variation in external capital structures. In our econometric work, we 
focus on emerging market and developing countries. One reason is that the external capital structures 
of advanced economies are heavily influenced by two-way financial integration, with equity-debt 
ratios signaling relatively little about the underlying fundamentals of these countries. (For the same 
reason, we drop offshore financial centers from the sample.) In contrast, there is a widespread 
consensus on the importance of raising the equity share in foreign liabilities for emerging markets and 
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3.  Empirical Approach and Estimation Results 
Our estimation strategy is as follows. In terms of empirical specification, we first follow the tradition 
in this literature by analyzing the cross-sectional relationship between capital structure and various 
determinants: 
                              1 it it it it YI N S T Z α βγ ε =+ + +                                     (1)   
where  it INST  is a measure of institutional quality and it Z  is a set of other determinants.   
One potential problem with the cross-sectional approach is that unobserved country-specific 
factors may contribute to determining external capital structures. A second problem is that a country’s 
external capital structure may deviate from its ‘equilibrium’ value if adjustment to shifts in its 
determinants is gradual. Accordingly, in order to directly investigate the connection between 
institutional and policy reform and change in external capital structure over 1996-2004, we also 
consider dynamic specifications. One is the first-difference estimator 
  [ ] [ ] 11 1 1 it it it it it it it Y Y INST INST Z Z u φβ γ −− −= + − + − + −  (2)   
A second dynamic specification includes a term that measures the deviation from equilibrium in the 
initial period, so as to capture the fact that adjustment to ‘equilibrium’ external capital structures may 
take time: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 11 1 1 1 it it it it it it it it Y Y INST INST Z Z GAP u φβ γ δ −− − −= + − + − − + −         (3) 
where   is the residual from a cross-sectional specification based on data at the start of the 
sample period. If gradual adjustment is an important factor, we may expect countries with a positive 
 value to see a smaller change in external capital structure than warranted by the change in the 
1 it GAP −
GAP
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regressors; conversely, a negative GAP value would be associated with a larger change in external 
capital structure than warranted by the change in the regressors.
1  
3.1  Cross-sectional estimates 
We first consider cross-sectional specifications that have been the primary focus of the literature on 
external capital structure until now. We examine three dimensions of external capital structure: the 
ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP; the share of equity (portfolio and FDI) in total foreign 
liabilities; and the share of FDI in total foreign equity liabilities. We report estimates for two years: 
1996 (at the beginning of the acceleration in financial globalization) and 2004 (the most recent year in 
our sample). The choice of initial year is also influenced by the fact that 1996 is the first year in the 
dataset on institutional quality assembled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). 
The choice of regressors largely follows the recent work of Faria and Mauro (2004) that 
examined a broad range of potential determinants of external capital structure. However, some of the 
variables considered by these authors (such as educational attainment) are excluded because these 
added little explanatory power (owing in part to limited time-series variation in the data) and reduced 
sample size. Following the framework laid out above, in order to assess the relation between external 
capital structure and the institutional environment, a core regressor is an institutional quality index, 
measured as the simple average of six individual indicators constructed by Kaufmann and others 
(2005): Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence;  Government 
Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption.
2 This index is available 
at a bi-annual frequency between 1996 and 2004, allowing us to consider the association between 
                                                 
1 The cross-sectional benchmark will be less useful, the more important are country fixed effects (that are not 
captured in such a specification). However, that should introduce a bias towards not finding a significantly 
negative role for the GAP term. 
2 In the full country sample of Kaufmann and others (2005), the index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 (for 99 percent of 
the observations), with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one; the range is narrower in our sample 
because we exclude the advanced economies and the countries without adequate data coverage. 
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institutional quality and external capital structure at different points of time and the co-movement 
between changes in institutional quality and changes in external capital structure. 
The other main explanatory variables include the size of the economy (total GDP in U.S. 
dollars); the level of economic development (GDP per capita in U.S. dollars); openness (sum of 
imports and exports over GDP); and the relative importance of natural resources (share of exports of 
fuels, metals, and ores as a ratio to total exports). Several of these potential explanatory variables are 
correlated with each other, highlighting the importance of using multivariate regressions. Estimation 
is by ordinary least squares.
 Faria and Mauro (2004) show that estimation by instrumental variables 
delivers broadly similar results. The difficulty of establishing good instruments when considering 
time-series information (notably, for the change in institutional quality between 1996 and 2004) 
means that we confine attention to estimating partial correlations in this paper. 
Column (1) of Table 1 shows that natural resources and country size (highly correlated with 
trade openness) are significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the ratio of total liabilities 
to GDP in 1996; the pattern is slightly different for the 2004 cross section in column (4), where 
institutional quality, country size, and trade openness are significant. Turning to the share of equity in 
total liabilities, columns (2) and (5) show a significant role for the institutional quality variable in 
both 1996 and 2004: countries with better institutions have a greater share of equity instruments in 
total liabilities. In addition, the equity share is positively correlated with country size and the ratio of 
natural resources to GDP for both the 1996 and 2004 cross sections, while trade openness is also 
significant in the 2004 cross section. Columns (3) and (6) show that the distribution of equity 
liabilities between direct investment and portfolio equity is influenced by country size, with larger 
countries having a greater proportion of portfolio equity liabilities.  
In summary, the cross-sectional estimates for 1996 and 2004 show broadly the same pattern 
across the two time periods. In particular, the cross-country variation in the share of equity in total 
liabilities is positively associated with the level of institutional quality. Among the other covariates, 
we find that larger countries have smaller total liabilities but a greater share of equity (especially 
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portfolio equity) in total liabilities. In addition, in the 2004 cross-section the equity share is also 
positively associated with greater trade openness and a higher reliance on natural resources. 
3.2  Dynamic Approach 
 
We turn to a dynamic analysis in Tables 2a-2b, where the goal is to understand the co-movements 
between changes in external capital structure and changes in the independent variables between 1996 
and 2004. We begin in Table 2a with a simple first-difference specification, which allows us to focus 
on the time series information in the data by eliminating the impact of country fixed effects.  
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2a report estimates for the broad sample of emerging market and 
developing countries. These regressions show that some dimensions of changes in external capital 
structure can be successfully related to some of our independent variables. In particular, we find in 
column (1) that growth in the ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP over 1996 to 2004 is positively 
associated with growth in output per capita and in trade openness. Furthermore, column (2) shows 
that growth in output per capita is also positively associated with an increase in the equity share in 
total liabilities. While the equity share in liabilities is positively associated with country size in the 
cross-section, faster population growth is associated with a fall in the equity share in the dynamic 
specification. Finally, the low R
2 in column (3) shows that our specification is unable to explain the 
relative growth of FDI versus portfolio equity during this period.  
A common feature across columns (1)-(3) is that changes in external capital structure cannot 
be related to changes in the index of institutional quality. This is not surprising, because measured 
changes in this index over a relatively short time period are limited. Thus, at the price of a major 
reduction in sample size, we examine an alternative specification in columns (4)-(6) that also includes 
a variable that captures changes in financial sector policies during this period. We exploit the 
database constructed by Detragiache and others (2006) which tracks financial reforms in seven areas 
and provides indices of reforms in each area considered: credit controls, interest rate controls, entry 
barriers, bank regulations, privatization, capital account, and securities markets. Following 
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Detragiache and others (2006), we employ the average across these indices as a general measure of 
the level of financial reform at a national level.
3  
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2a show that the financial reform index is significant in 
explaining changes in the ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP and in the equity share in liabilities: 
countries that undertook deeper financial reforms during this period saw a decrease in the ratio of 
total liabilities to GDP but also a larger shift towards equity-type instruments. However, the financial 
reform index does not help explain changes in the relative importance of direct investment versus 
portfolio equity investment (column 6).  
As discussed earlier, a potential limitation of the simple first-difference estimator is that it 
does not allow for gradual adjustment to the equilibrium capital structure. Accordingly, Table 2b 
reports the results from the dynamic specification that includes the GAP variable (which captures 
deviation from equilibrium in the initial year). This two-step procedure, in which the residuals from 
the 1996 cross section enter the dynamic equation for changes between 1996 and 2004, imputes a 
generated regressor in the regression of changes on changes. As discussed by Murphy and Topel 
(1985) and Newey and McFadden (1994), a simple OLS approach that fails to take this into account 
generates a bias in the estimated covariance matrices, thus making inference invalid. To correct for 
this problem, we follow the approach of Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and Aguiar and Hurst (2005) 
among others, and bootstrap the first and second stages of the estimation procedure together. It has 
been shown that this relative simple procedure works at least as well as the asymptotic distribution in 
small samples (Horowitz, 2001). (Relative to OLS, we usually find that the bootstrapped standard 
errors are substantially larger.) 
Taking first the results for the broad sample in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2b, the introduction 
of the GAP variable substantially raises the overall explanatory power of these regressions. Moreover, 
the GAP variable is itself significant: relative to the equilibrium values implied by the 1996 cross-
                                                 
3 A separate measure of capital account liberalization turned out to be typically individually insignificant. 
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sectional estimates, and controlling for changes in the ‘fundamentals’, countries with a low share of 
equity in total liabilities and a low share of FDI within the equity category saw faster growth in these 
ratios over 1996 to 2004. The importance of the GAP variable illustrates how the values of key 
variables (such as institutional quality) can have a persistent impact on the dynamics of external 
capital structure if adjustment towards the equilibrium capital structure occurs gradually.  
We next turn to the specifications for the narrower sample that includes the financial reform 
variable in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2b. For this sample, the GAP variable is significant only in the 
total liabilities regression in column (4); it also renders the financial reform index insignificant in this 
regression. However, financial reform remains significant as a correlate for the change in the equity 
share in liabilities in column (5). Finally, the introduction of the GAP variable in column (6) has only 
a limited impact on our ability to capture the covariates of changes in the FDI share in equity 
liabilities. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Our goal in this paper has been to examine the shift toward equity (FDI and portfolio equity) in the 
composition of external liabilities, with a focus on emerging markets and developing economies. In 
particular, we have attempted to capture the most important covariates of the equity share in total 
foreign liabilities, a ratio that has featured heavily in recent policy analyses of the financial stability of 
these countries.  
We have shown that, along the cross-sectional dimension, larger, more open economies with 
a better institutional quality score and a greater reliance on natural resource production have a greater 
share of equity in external liabilities. Along the time-series dimension, the increase in the ratio of total 
liabilities to GDP is larger for countries with higher growth and increased openness, and the shift 
towards equity financing is stronger among those countries that have undertaken more domestic 
financial reforms. In addition, we have shown the importance of a dynamic approach to estimation, in 
view of the gradual nature of adjustment towards equilibrium capital structures. 
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This study provides only an initial step in uncovering the dynamic relation between changes 
in external capital structure and in economic fundamentals. For instance, we have focused on the co-
movement between external capital structure and general indices of institutional quality and domestic 
financial reform. It could be enlightening to disaggregate these general indices and investigate which 
are the most important institutional changes and dimensions of financial reforms for the various 
components of external capital structure. A further extension could verify whether an increase in the 
equity share of liabilities is indeed associated with improved international risk sharing and greater 
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Table 1.  External Capital Structure: Cross-Sectional Evidence, 1996 and 2004 
 
1996
Total Eq.Share FDI/Equity Total Eq.Share FDI/Equity
Institutional quality index 0.263 0.088** -0.047 0.241** 0.08* -0.059
(0.143) (0.046) (0.033) (0.100) (0.046) (0.039)
GDP (log) -0.047 0.023** -0.066*** -0.066** 0.029** -0.064***
(0.041) (0.013) (0.01) (0.030) (0.014) (0.011)
GDP per capita (log) -0.18* 0.017 0.025 -0.098 0.012 0.035
(0.08) (0.026) (0.019) (0.061) (0.028) (0.022)
Openness 0.14 0.101 -0.031 0.257* 0.151** -0.029
(0.23) (0.073) (0.053) (0.130) (0.060) (0.050)
Natural resources 0.41** 0.167** 0.047 0.236 0.157** 0.037
(0.204) (0.066) (0.047) (0.154) (0.071) (0.059)
Constant 1.11** -0.077 1.55*** 1.43*** -0.042 1.53***
(0.49) (0.156) (0.11) (0.35) (0.164) (0.14)
Observations 74 74 74 73 73 73




Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *,**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. Total liabilities (expressed as a ratio to GDP) consist of the sum of total equity plus 
portfolio debt, and other liabilities; Eq. Share is the ratio of (portfolio and FDI) equity in total 
liabilities;  FDI/Equity is the ratio of FDI liabilities to total equity liabilities. The Institutional Quality 
Index is the simple average of six indicators from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005): voice and 
accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory 
quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. GDP and GDP per capita are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Openness is the sum of imports and exports, divided by GDP 
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Table 2a. Dynamics of External Capital Structure I: 1996-2004   (Basic Specification) 
 
Full
Total Eq.Share FDI/Equity Total Eq.Share FDI/Equity
Institutional quality index -0.07 0.052 -0.058 -0.02 0.039 -0.057
(0.17) (0.051) (0.048) (0.2) (0.065) (0.084)
Financial reform index -1.18* 0.55** -0.072
(0.67) (0.22) (0.287)
GDP (log) -0.076 -0.039** -0.01 -0.08 0.003 -0.023
(0.05) (0.015) (0.014) (0.082) (0.027) (0.035)
GDP per capita (log) 0.11** 0.025* 0.005 0.12 -0.016 0.017
(0.043) (0.013) (0.012) (0.08) (0.026) (0.034)
Openness 0.94** 0.17 0.004 0.43 0.282 -0.123
(0.41) (0.12) (0.12) (0.6) (0.199) (0.257)
Natural resources -0.24 0.038 0.14 1.0 -0.128 0.463
(0.4) (0.12) (0.11) (0.71) (0.236) (0.305)
Constant 0.02 0.23*** -0.002 0.22 0.076 0.038
(0.15) (0.05) (0.04) (0.24) (0.080) (0.103)
Observations 62 62 62 35 35 35




Table 2b.  Dynamics of External Capital Structure II: 1996-2004 
 
Full
Total Eq.Share FDI/Equity Total Eq.Share FDI/Equity
Institutional quality index -0.053 0.034 -0.07 -0.026 0.048 -0.07
(0.15) (0.052) (0.05) (0.170) (0.081) (0.09)
Financial reform index -1.317 0.503* -0.08
(0.789) (0.274) (0.36)
GDP (log) -0.08 -0.024 -0.012 -0.067 0.008 -0.028
(0.05) (0.015) (0.013) (0.104) (0.029) (0.045)
GDP per capita (log) 0.08* 0.024 0.01 0.070 -0.016 0.020
(0.045) (0.014) (0.01) (0.095) (0.029) (0.04)
Openness 0.84** 0.17 -0.01 0.407 0.28 -0.124
(0.4) (0.13) (0.09) (0.865) (0.248) (0.34)
Natural resources -0.001 0.15 0.805 -0.08 0.443
(0.61) (0.16) (0.759) (0.27) (0.4)
ECM -0.5*** -0.31** -0.33** -0.73** -0.13 -0.42
(0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.3) (0.25) (0.35)
Constant 0.1 0.17*** 0.003 0.31 0.06 0.05
(0.13) (0.05) (0.04) (0.27) (0.09) (0.13)
Observations 62 62 62 35 35 35
R-squared 0.49 0.27 0.14 0.48 0.29 0.19
Narrow
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Note to Tables 2a and 2b: Standard errors in parentheses; *,**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels respectively. Total liabilities (expressed as a ratio to GDP) consist of the sum of 
total equity plus portfolio debt, and other liabilities; Eq. Share is the ratio of (portfolio and FDI) 
equity in total liabilities;  FDI/Equity is the ratio of FDI liabilities to total equity liabilities. The 
Institutional Quality Index is the simple average of six indicators from Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2005): voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. The financial reform index is 
a composite of indices of reforms in credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, bank 
regulations, privatization, capital account, and securities market.  GDP and GDP per capita are from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). Openness is the sum of imports and exports, 
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Figure 1.  
 
Gross External Liabilities as a Share of GDP, High-income and other countries 
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
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